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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE A. SI~IS. :JI. IC SL\IS,
ELl\fER L. SI~rs AND G. GRAN'r
S I l\1 S , d /b I a SALT LAKE
TRANSFER CO~IPA:NY,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CASE

N0. 7377

PUBLIC SERYICE CO~I~IISSION
0 F uTAH AXD l\I A G N AGARFIELD TRrCK LINE, a
corporation,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
SrPPLE~IEXTAL

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS .

The statement of facts contained in plaintiffs' brief
fails to set forth certain eYidence vital to the rights in
these proceedings of defendant ~lagna-Garfield Truck
Line. It is, therefore, deemed necessary to supplement
plaintiffs' statement of facts, in order to present to the
Court the full force of th~ evidence received by the
Public Service Commission, upon which it denied plaintiffs' application for a contract -carrier's permit.
1
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The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line is a consolidated corporation organized and existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, consisting of
two former corporations organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Utah, known and designated as
Magna-Garfield Truck Line and Salt Lake & Bingham
Freight Lines. The said defendant received its Certificate- of Incorporation from the Secretary of State of
Utah on the 31st day of December, 1946. (R. 113, 114)
Salt Lake & Bingham Freight Lines (being one of the
consolidating corporations as aforesaid) was the owner
and holder as a common motor carrier of property in
intra-state commerce of the following Certificates of
Convenience and Necessity issued by the Public Service
Commission of Utah (R. 115):
Certificate
No.

Date

Case
No.

296

April21, 1927

963

658

April 23, 1945

2833

Said Magna-Garfield Truck Line (being also one of the
consolidating corporations as aforesaid) was the owner
and holder as a common motor carrier of property in
intra-state commerce of the following Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity issued by the Public Service
Commission of Utah (R. 114, 115):
Certificate
No.

Date

Case
No.

262

l\f arch 6, 1946

847
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In a proc_'eding ir:stituted before tl:e P··blic Serv~cc
Commission of Utah on the 5th day of February, 1947,
by sa:d defendant company, in the matter of the application of ~Iagna-Garfield Truck Line, a consolidated corporation of Magna-Garfield Truck Line and Salt Lake &
Binghan1 Freight Lines, designated No. 3092, the said
Commission, by order dated the 6th day of May, 1947
(R. 113, 118) did cancel and annul Certificate of Convenience and Xecessity X o. 262, issued to said :Magna-Garfield Truck Line (being one of the consolidating corporations) in Case Xo. 847, and Certificates of ConveniencP
and Xecessity X os. 296 and 658 issued to Salt Lake &
Bingham Freight Lines (being one of the consolidating
corporations) in Cases Xos. 963 and 2833, and in lieu
thereof said Commission issued unto defendant company
Certificate of Convenience and ~ecessity ~o. 771 (R.113)
to operate as common .motor carrier for the transportation of commodities generally from Salt Lake City, Utah,
to Garfield, Utah, over United States Highway X o. 91 to
junction with Vnited States Highway ~ o. 50, thence
over United States Highway X o. 50 and return over the
same route, including all intermediate points and offroute point of Bacchus, Utah; and from Salt Lake City,
Utah, to \Vest Jordan, South Jordan, Riverton, Bluffdale, Herriman and Bingham, Utah, over United States
Highway No. 91 and State and County roads and return,
including all intermediate points, except that no service
was authorized on United States Highway No. 91 between
33rd South s·t. and Sandy, Utah, including Midvale, Utah.
Acting under and by virtue of the authority con3
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tained in and incidental to said Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity No. 771 as aforesaid, defendant Magn_aGarfield Truck Line (the consolidated corporation) has
continuously since the 6th day of May, 1947, operated
as a common carrier for the transportation of commodities generally over and upon the aforesaid routes de~eribed in said Certificate of Convenience and "Necessity.
(R. 140, 141, 142)
The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line has in
all respects and particulars complied with the terms,
conditions and restrictions contained in said Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity (R. 140)· and in particular
said defendant has maintained on file with the aforesaid
Commission all insurance required by law, and all tariff~,
containing complete information as to rates, rules, regulations and schedules. (R. 140) Said defendant has
operated as a common motor carrier of commodities
over the aforesaid routes at all times in accordance with
the statutes of the State of Utah and the rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission of Utah existing
on the date of said Certificate of Convenience and Neeessity, and which were thereafter prescribed by said
Commission, governing the -operations of common motor
carriers over the public highways of the State of Utah.
(R. 140)
For a long time prior to the granting of said Certifi~
eate of Convenience and Necessity No. 771, the two consolidating .corporations . aforesaid (predecessors of this
defendant) bper~te·a O"~et the aforesaid routes described
in the afores-aid Ce~i·tificate- of Conve-nience and Necessity,
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·as eonuuon 1notor earriers of commodities g<'nt>rally, an. I
rendered nnto ·the public rt-~hH)nably adequate and continuous ~erYiee a~ such earrier~. (R. 114, 115, 141) :--;aid
defendant, as the consolidated corporation, has continued
:'aid operation, and has fulfilled all requirements of la'".
and all of the requiren1ents and regulations of the afore- .
said Public ~erYicP Commission in the aforesaid opera,tions. (~. 140, 141) The said defendant has operated
upon a regular schedule, averaging three truck movements per day fron1 Salt Lake City to Bingham and
Lark and return. (R. 142, 153) The said defendant
company owns four trucks capable of handling five
tons, or 10,000 pounds each, three trucks capable of handling ten tons, or 20,000 pounds each, one pickup truck,
and one ten-ton semi-trailer. (R. 142) It has twelve
employees, six of whom are regularly employed as truck
drivers. (R. 143, 155) Two of its shop men are also
qualified truck drivers, and can be used in emergency
to -drive trucks. (R. 155) Its trucks are capable of handling 100,000 pounds of commodities per day. (R. 145)
It is able to rent trucks for operations in excess of its
normal operations or scheduled runs. (R. 145) All equipment is in~'A-1 condition". (R. 144)
The West Jordan plant of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company is located about ten miles. south of Salt Lake City,
on Redwood Road. _The factory itself stands about two
blocks from
the -highway. (R. 142) The defendor three
.
ant company operates its scheduled freight service over
Redwood Road from Salt Lake City to Binp;lwr:1 and
Lark. (R. 142) The defendant company has takeri- carr
;)
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of all requests made by the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company
to move sugar from West Jordan to Salt Lake City, with
one exception. (R. 144) This .·exception involved a telephone call in the late afternoon, whereby the Sugar
Company requested a truck at its West Jordan plant
within one-half hour. The defendant company informed
the Sugar Company that it would provide a truck within
two hours, which still permitted the movement of the
sugar into Salt Lake City the same day. (R. 144) This
episode occurred during the peak season of sugar haulage in June. ( R. 144) The handling of sugar does not
require any unusual or extraordinary equipment other
than it must be of such nature as to keep the sugar dry.
(R. 107, 146) The equipment of the defendant MagnaGarfield Truck Line is of that nature, four trucks being
closed trucks. (R. 146) Said defendant has handled both
l. t.l. shipments and t.l. shipments, some of the shipments
being from the Sugar Factory _to, towns served directly
by said defendant. These shipmeritl3 were usually small5 to 10 bags each. ( R. 110, 146) Said defendant company
has also moved some truckload- shipments from West
Jordan to Security Warehouse in Salt Lake and to candy
companies. (R. 147) These·ship~ents occurred only dur~
ing the peak season, which is the canning season. (R. 147)
Said defendant is able to handle all peak sugar movements
(R. 150) and if the movement of more than 1,000 bags a
day is required, said defendant is in a position to buy
more trucks or rent trucks to take care of the emergency.
(R. 151)

The Utah-Idaho Sugar Company offered no criticism
6
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of the handling of its shipments by the defendant ('0111pany. nor did it make any criticism of its automotive
equipn1ent. (R. 106) The service rendered it by defendant
company has been very satisfactory. (R. 106) It supported plaintiffs' application for a contract carrier permit because it desired speedy service rather than "emerg·ency" service. (R. 103, 107) The defendant company
has never refused the Sugar Company con1mon carrie~·
service. ( R. 103)
The plaintiffs prior to the filing of their application
for a contract carrier's permit in the. instant case had
served Utah-Idaho Sugar Company under a ''purported
oral agreement". (R. 70, 71, 73, 75, 92, 102) They
rendered such service without any formal authority from
the Public Service Commission. ( R. 84)
The following colloquy between Mr. Donald Hacking,
Chairman of the Public Service Commission of Utah,
and l\Ir. Elmer L. Sims, a witness for the plaintiffs, is
pertinent:
''CoM. HACKING: As I understand your testimony, you have rendered this service to the UtahIdaho Sugar Company at West Jordan for some
considerable period of time?
A. Yes.

CoM. HACKING: And are still rendering it. As
you stated, you sent a truck out yesterday')?
A. Yes.
Co~r. HACKIXG: ~ow, under what claim of
authority have you been rendering this service
· since the effective day of the 1945 Amendment to
the l\rotor Carrier Act, excluding from the exemp-

7
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tion the contract hauls fifteen miles beyond the
city limits~
A. Well, I thought that we automatically had
the right to continue doing the type of business
we were prior to 1945; that if we were operating
as a contract carrier permit prior to that time, we
could continue to operate.
CoM. HACKING: That is, you had the view that
you would have that authority automatically,
without any specific written authority from this
Commission~

A. I thought we could continue it, see.
CoM. HAcKING: Has the Commission, through
its enforcement department, questioned that authority and cheeked you on-:that ~
A. They have never questioned us on this
\Yest .Jordan haul. I believe the Commission has
known for quite a period of time, we were hauling
this sugar. As a matter of fact, I filed a contract
with you. No one seems to be able to find it, but,
if I remember correctly, I filed the contract with
the Commission almost a year ago.
co~r. HACKING: Isn't it a fact, Elmer, that
you have procured temporary authorities from
time to time in some of these cases, where there
has been a big movement of sugar, to make the
haul J
A. Yes sir, we have. From Ogden and Lehi.
CoM. HACKING: Have yon ('\Ter from West
Jordan~

A. I don't believe so. '' ( R. 84, 85)
Also, the following part of the testimony of Mr.
George A. Sims, a witness on behalf of plaintiffs, given
on direct examination is extremely relevant:

8
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''Q. Mr. Sims, this is an application relative
to a contract carrier authority to operatP for and
on behalf of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company between \Y est Jordan and Salt Lake City. Will
you state how long you have engaged in that
type of operation ~
...:\.. 'Yell, we haYe been hauling for the Sugar
Company back as far as I can remember, and
that would be in '35, 1935. And we have produced
eYidence at our hearing '"hen we applied for one
rights, and the Commission said we were not only
cornmon carriers for certain articles, but we were
a contract carrier and we were given the rights
to be a contract carrier at that time.
Q. Directing your attention to the year 1940,
were you, during 1940 and prior thereto, engaged
as a contract carrier, by verbal contract, with the
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company in transporting their
commodities between West Jordan and Salt Lake?
A. Yes; we made an agreement with them
to haulMR. RITER: I am going to object to that question, and I am doing it for the purpose of the
record here. • * *
CoM. HACKING: The objection will be overruled.
MR. PuGSLEY: You may answer.
THE WITNESS: Repeat that question:
(Question read.)
A. Yes sir, and since that time.
Q (By Mr. Pugsley). Since that time have
you served them under this oral arrangement,
from time to time~
A. Yes, whenever they needed us." (R. 65,
66, 67)
9
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Mr. George A. Sims also testified on cross-examination in part as follows:· -

·" Q. Well now, you used a clause here on a
statement, that interested me very much, in testifying as to your service to the Utah-Idaho Sugar
Company. You said, '\Vhenever they needed it'.
As a matter of fact, your practice has been
that when the Sugar Company called up you
responded with one of your trucks, didn't you~
A. Yes sir.

0. And you made your arrangement then and
~there

as to what the rate would

be~

·

A. They already had our price we \vere working for.

Q. You had discussed the prices, what you
were working for, previously~
A. Oh

y<·~.

Q. But so far as the immediate arrangement
went, it was principally by telephone, I assume¥
A. After the first arrangement was made.
with them, yes sir.
Q. \V ell, what do you mean by 'an oral agreement', then~
A. By an oral agreement is where you go
see a firm, and they ask you what you would haul
-how much a hundred pounds you would haul
from a certain point to a certain point, based on
a quantity of so much.

-Q. Well, Mr. Sims, when you examined _the
record in your case-you recall your case that
made.a lot of htw for us, that went. to the Supreme
Court~

10
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A. Yes, it went to the Supre1ne Court twice.

Q. Yes, it went to the Supreme Court twice,
and when you examined the Public Service Commission's record in that case, you recall-when.
the permit as contract carrier was issued to you
there was six different firms specified you would
serve1
A. Yes, sir, but I was given the impression
that all that was necessary after we were given
the rights of a contract carrier, all we would
have to do was file another contract, and it would
automatically go into effect. That was the understanding of why they gave us this as a contract
carrier.
Q. AU right. You could read the orders of the
Commission in that respect, couldn't you 1

A. Yes sir.
Q. And you know that-what those orders
specified, didn't you-in detail the Commission
pursued that matter, and very carefully enumerated the concerns for which you could carry as
contract carrier~

MR. ruGSLEY: well, just one moment. I object
to this as calling for a legal conclusion, and, further, the fact that the Commission will take judicial notice of the fact that this sugar factory is
within the fifteen-mile zone which was exempt
at the time this former order was issued. * 'X< *
*

CoM.
ruled.

HAcKING-:

*

*

¥,:

*

The objection will be over-

A. I thought I knew, but the thing has been
twisted around now so I don't know where I am at.
11
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Q. Well, Mr. Sims, as a matter of fairnes8
to you, would you like to see the copy of the
amended order of the Commission on the 23rd
of February, 1939, in Case 1849 ~ * * *
A. It is case No. 1849. Yes, I have read it.
Q. (By Mr. Riter) : You don't notice the
name of the Utah-Idaho Sugar in there, ·do you~

A. No sir.
Q. Were you hauling for the Utah-Idaho
Sugar at that time~
A. Yes sir.
Q. Do you want to go back there and read
the whole opinion of the Commission on there,
where they define the difference between the contract carriers and common carriers~
A. I think I know.

Q. You think you know

that~

A. Right.
Q. Then you recall what the Commission told
you at that time was the exact difference between
the two, and they defined it~
A. I think I could define it.
Q. My point is this, after that extensive litigation which you took to the Supreme Court
twice, and after these elaborate proceedings before the Public Service Commission, all of which
you were informed of because you paid for, of
course-now I want to know why, in face of that,
did you ignore this Utah-Idaho Sugar situation?

.MR. PuGSLEY: I object to that, as no evidence
in the record he has ignored the Utah-Idaho
situation at all.
12
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iliR. RITER: Perhaps the best way right now
to withdraw.
I expected ~Ir. Pugsley would introduce into
this hearing these basic proceedings that enter
relevantly into any consideration of this. Are
you going to introduce them in evidence~
:JIR. PeasLEY : I am not.
:JIR. RITER: \Yill you take judicial notice of it~
CoM. HAcKING: Mr. Riter, is West Jordan
within fifteen miles of Salt Lake City limits~
~IR. RITER : Yes, it is.
:JIR. PuGSLEY : Yes sir.
CoM. HACKING: Well, at that time the Salt
Lake Transfer could have served West Jordan
without any authority.
:JIR. RITER: Under the old law.
CoM. HACKING: Under the old law.
:JIR. PuGSLEY: That's right.
CoM. HAcKING: That is, at the time this report
and order was made and issued by the Commission, there was no particular need to consider the
"~est Jordan movement, was there~
1s

:JlR. RITER: Except this, that this whole matter of their contract carrier status was being
considered hy the Commission, and :Jlr. Sims has
testified that at that time they were serving UtahIdaho Sugar Company, and what I want to know
is why, in view of these plenary proceedings that
were before this Commission ann before the
Supreme Court, why at that time this Utah-Idaho
Sugar situation wasn't brought to the attention
of the Commission ~
CoM. HACKI~G: Can you answer that, :Mr.
Sims~

13
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A. Yes sir. The"re was a elause in the la·\\that we were operating under then that we had a
right to take eare of interurban delivery of general eommodities anywhere within a radius of
fifteen miles of the eity limits, .and that wasn't
only for one firm, but that was a State-wide
exemption, so that a man living in the eountry
eould deliver something over fifteen miles to a
neighbor in town, and likewise, here, and we
operated under that. I helped put the clause in."
(R. 70-76)
The plaintiffs are the owners -and holders of Certificate
of Convenienee and Necessity No. 512 dated-January 19,
1939. (R. 119, 135-) This Certificate permits them to tran~
port in intra-state commerge commodjties which by reason of their size, shape, weight, origin or destination
require special equipment or service of a character not
regularly furnished by common carriers at regular line
rates; commodities in connection with the transportation
of which is rendered a special service in preparing such
comnwdities for shipment or setting up after delivery,
or otherwise rendering a service not a part of ordinary
act of transportation, and not regularly furnished by
other common carriers; and camp site equipment . (R. 135,
137) Plaintiffs are also the holders of contract carrier
permit No. 212 (amended) dated February 23, 193~,
issued in Case No. 1849 (R. 73, 125, 126, 132) wherein
the plaintiffs are authorized to transport certain specified property for six identified contractees (none of whom.
was the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company) over several separate routes in the State of Utah. (R. 73, 75)

14
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~\.RGU~lE~T

I.
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT TO A CONTRACT
CARRIER PERMIT UNDER THE SO-CALLED
"GRANDFATHER" RIGHT AS PROVIDED BY
SECTION 76-5-21, UTAH CODE 1943, AS AMENDED BY LAWS OF UTAH 1945, CHAPTER 105,
SECTION 3, PAGE 209.

Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943, as amended by Laws
of Utah, 19-±5, Chapter 105, Section 3, Page 209, was
operative on the date of the application of plaintiffs for
a contract carrier permit. The present statute reads a::;
follows:
76-5-21.

''It shall be unlawful for any contract motor
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate commerce ·without having first obtained fron1 the
commission a permit therefor. The Commission
shall grant on application to any applicant who
was a contract motor carrier as defined by this
act on the 1st day of January, 1940, a permit to
operate as a contract motor carrier on the same
highways and to carry on the same type of motor
service as he was on said date.
"The commission upon the filing of an application for a qontract motor carrier's permit shall
fix a time and place for hearing thereon and may
give the same noticelas provided in section 76-5-18
hereof. If, from all the testimony offered at said
hearing, the commission shall determine that the
highways over which the applicant desires to
operate are not unduly burdened; that the granting of the application will npt unduly interfere
with the traveling public; and that the granting
15
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of the application will not be detrimental to the
best interests of the people of the state of Utah
and/ or to the localities to be served, and if the
existing transportation facilities do not provide
adequate or reasonable service, the commission
shall grant such permit."
The plaintiffs assign as error the action of the Commission in refu~ing to grant plaintiffs a contract carrier
permit to haul sugar _between West Jordan and Salt Lake
City, Utah, f.or the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. Fundamentally, this claim_ of error is based upon the purported
"grandfather" clause contained in the above quoted
statute, and reading as follows:
''The commission shall grant on application
to any .applicant \vho was a contract motor carrier
as defined by this act on the 1st day of January,
1940,. a permit to operate as a contract motor carrier on the same highways and to carry on the
same type of motor service as he was on said
date."
According to plaintiffs' contention, this permit should
have issued to the plaintiffs as a matter of right upon
their showing that on the 1st day of January, 1940, they
were operating as a contract carrier for the Utah-Idaho
Sugar Company on the public highway between West
Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah.
The imm.ediate antecedent of the present :statute is
Section 9 of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, which reads
in pertinent part as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any contract motor
carrier to operate as a carrier in trastate commerce without having first obtained from the com16
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Inission a perinit therefol·. The commission shall
grant on application to any applicant who was :.1
contract n1otor carrier as defined by this act on
the fifteenth day of .March, 1933, a permit to
operate as a contract nwtor carrier on the sanw
highways and to carry on the same type of motor
serYice as he was prior to said date. Where said
applicants were operating· on all the highways
of the state prior to said date, the permit shall
authorize them to continue to operate on all of
said highways. The commission shall furthermore grant on application to any applicant who
received a permit to operate as a contract motor
carrier between the fifteenth day of March, 1933,
and the date on which this act takes effect, a
permit to continue to operate in the same manner
and over the same highways as the terms of said
permit allowed.
"The commission upon the filing of an application for a contract motor carrier's permit by any
other person than those referred to above in this
section shall fix a time and place for hearing thereon and shall give the same notice as provided in
section 6 hereof. * * * If, from all the testimony
offered at said hearing, the commission shall
determine that the highways over which the applicant desires to operate are not unduly burdened:
that the granting of the application will not unduly
interfere with the traveling public; and that the
granting of the application will not be detrimental
to the best interests of the people of the state
of Utah and/or to the localities to be served, the
commission shall grant such permit; * " * ''
(Italics supplied)
A comparison of the law under which plaintiffs made
their application on November 10, 1947, with the relevant
17
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provi~ions

of the 1935 statute last above quoted, clearly
sh.ows that the Legislature, in providing for the "grandfather'' rights, intended to rnodify in a radical manner
the provisions of the prior law. In order to understand
this change, it is necessary to refer to the case of McCa·rthy v . Public Service Commission of Utah, 94 Ut.
304, 77 Pac. 2d 331. This decision, in interpreting Section 9 of Chapter G5, Laws of Utah, 1935, took note of
the fact that the statute made no provision for notice
and hearing in the granting of contract carrier permits
under the ''grandfather'' clause, but that the application
for such permit by any other contract motor carrier, viz.
new-comers in the contract motor business, should be
set for hearing at a time and place fixed by the Commission, and notice be given to all adversely interested
in the same. The ''grandfather'' clause of this statute
favored two classes: (a) those who were contract carriers as defined by the act on March 15, 1933, and (b)
those "~ho received a permit as contract carrier after
~larch 15, 1933 and before the effective date of Chapter
65 (December 31, 1935). The Court, however, specifically
declined to accept the literal reading of the statute,
using this language :
''But it was never intended by the ·Legislature
that these permits issued under the act to existing
or antecedent contract· carriers without a hearing
or: ilcrtfce :to. others, should be conclusive and binding determinations of the right of such permittees
to operate thereunder, or to perform any other or
different service than specified therein or e.ven the
class of service therein stated. In the nature of
the case, such permits can only operate as prima
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facie eYidenre of the right of the permitteP to
operate thereunder. Len~t of all, can it be properly ~aid that such a permit, issued upon application, exclude~ the right of a competitor to contend
and to show to the Conunission by protest, objection, or otherwise that the permittee in his operations thereunder has exceeded the limits or
character of serTice pern1itted thereby, and has
entered into regular competition with-let us say
-con1mon motor carriers; that the permittee is
holding himself out to the public as equipped,
ready, and willing to accept loads wherever and by
whomsoever tendered; or that he has provided
himself with equipment for use in hauling loads
that unduly injure the highway, the public, and all
competitors; or that he is hauling regularly over
highways not specified in his permit. These and
many like subjects of inquiry might be suggested.
In any such case it would be the Commission's
duty to receive and file the complaints or objections made and to order a hearing to determine
the truth of the matter, notwithstanding that a
permit had already issued to the contract carrier
in question. This is not unfair to the latter,
for, had the permittee desired a permit or a
certificate of necessity that would be conclusive
and binding upon all comers, he had it in his
power to request a hearing of the Commission
and notice to all adversely concerned before the
issuance or acceptance of the permit. Upon constitutional principles the applicant cannot expect
a conclusive or binding determination upon an
ex parte application. Least of all, can he expect
that persons adversely affected by his application
shall be held bound or affected by mere selfserving declarations or statements contained in
his application for a permit." (pp. 336-337 of
77 Pac. 2d)
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As the McCarthy case, supra, points out, a distinction was made by the statute between applicants coming
und<:>r the "grandfather" clause and those who applied
for a permit who were not within the preferred classes.
PlaintiffH' argument would find weight had the 1935
statute been in operation at the time their application
with which the Court is novv concerned was filed.
\Vhen reference is made to Section 76-5-21 Utah
(jode 1943, as amended by Laws of Utah 1945, it will be
seen that the Legislature radically· changed the practice
in t~is regard. The statute, after providing that a contract motor carrier on the first day ·of January, 1940,
should be granted a permit, directs:
"The Commission upon the filing of .an applLcation for a contract motor carrier's permit shall
fix a .time and place for hearing thereon and may
give the same notice as provided in Section
76-5-18 hereof. If, from all the testimony offered
at said hearing, the commission shall determine
that the highways over which the applicant desires
to operate are not unduly burdened; that the
,granting of the applic~,t~on will not unduly interfere with the traveling public; and that the granting of the application will not be detri:rp.ental to
the best interests of the people of the state of
Utah and/or to the localities to be served, and
if the.existing transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable service, the commission shall grant' such permit. ''
Compare the correlative provisions of Chapter 65, Laws
of Utah 1935, whieh read:
''The commission, upon the filing of an application for a contract moto;r carrier's permit by
20
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any other person than those referred to above,
etc.," (Italics supplied)
with the provisions of Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943,
as amended by the La"·s of Utah of 1945, and it will he
thus seen that in the 19-15 act the legislature purposely
eliminated the phrase "by aJl.IJ other person than those
referred to above in this section," and added the words
··and if the existing transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable service,'' This change. in
phraseology clearly expresses an intent on the part of
the legislature that the practice of granting "grandfather'' permits ''·'ithout notice would thereafter be eliminated, and that all applications, whether under the
''grandfather'' preference or without the preference,
should be set for hearing, and notice thereof should be
given to interested parties. The McCarthy decision,
supra, was announced on March 12, 1938. It undoubtedly
influenced the form of the 1945 amendment.

It is manifest that the Court is now required to construe Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943, as amended by
Laws of Utah 1945, inasmuch as there exists on the face
of the statute an apparent contradiction. By the first
paragraph, the Commission is directed to grant on application to any applicant who was a contract motor
carrier as defined by the act on January 1, 1940, a permit to operate as a contract motor carrier on the same
highways and to carry on the same type of motor service
as he was on said date. By the second paragraph of
said section, the Commission is directed upon the filing
of an application for a contract motor ~arrier's permit
21
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to fix a tinw <Jnd place of hearing thereon, and to give
notiee thereof. It may use the method of notice provided
in Section /()_;)_18 Utah Code 1943. However, notice in
some form must lw gi,Ten. It is then provided that if the
Commission shall det<-'rmine "from all 'the testimony offPrPd at said hearing" that four enumerated conditions
are shown to exist, that permit shall issue. A literal
reading of this statute· produces confusion and contradiction. The section, after directing that an applicant who
was a contract motor carrier on January 1, 1940, shall receive a permit to operate as such motor carrier, then provides that the Commission shall hold a hearing after
notice, and receive evidence, and if such evidence meets
the conditions named, it shall grant a permit. If the construction is adopted such as the literal reading of the statute suggests, then the ''grandfather'' clause is wholly
destroyed. It is not believed that such construction or
interpretation of the statute would carry out the legislative intent. Therefore, the task· devolves upon the Court
to discover, if pos~ible, a construction of the'statute which
will give full weight to all its parts, eliminate absurdities,
and at the same time express the legislative intent.

a

The following rules for statutory construction are
applicable:
"In the interpretation of a statute,. the legi':ilature will be presumed to have inserted every
part thereof for a purpose, and to have intended
that every part of a statute should be carrie,l
into effect. The maxim, 'ut ies magis, quam
pereat,' requir.es not merely that a statute should
. be given effect as a whole, but that effed shoulcl
be given to eaC'h of its express·· ·p::r~·ovisions. A
Q::?
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statute should not be ronstnll'tl in such nmnn(•r
as to render it partly ineffeeti,·p or inefficient if
another construction will 1nake it effective. Indeed, it is a cardinal rulP of statutory construction
that i:lignifieanet> and effect should, if possiblP,
without destroying the sense or effect of the law,
be accorded every part of the act, including every
section, paragraph, sentence, ~lause, phrase, an(l
word. Under this rule, that construction is
favored 'vhich will render every word operative,
rather than one which makes some words idle
and nugatory. Sometimes, however, it is not
possible, in arriving .at the meaning of statutes,
to give force and effect to every word and phra~e
used. The court may not, in order to give effect
to particular words, virtually destroy the meaning of the entire context, that is, give them :1
significance which would be clearly repugnant to
the statute looked at as a whole and destructive
of its obvious intent. It has also been declared
that if a word is used unnecessarily in one part
of a statute, it may well be regarded as so used
in another.'' (50 Am. Jur., Sec. 358, pp. 361-3fj4.)
"It is a general rule of interpretation that
statutes should, if possible, be so construed as to
make them practicable. Hence, a construction of
an ambiguous statute should be avoided, which
would render the application of the statute inlpracticable, or which would require the performance of a vain, idle, or futile thing, or attempt to
require the performance of an impossible act.
Indeed, a statute will not be construed so as to
require the performance of an impossible act, if
any other construction can be legitimately given
it. There are some statutes, however, the utility
of which may not be considered. The courts can
only interpret a statute as framed, notwithstand-
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ing difficulties in its application.. " (50 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 36'0, p. 365,)
''Consistency in statutes is of prime importance,- and in the absence of a showing to the
contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent
with each other. Where it is possible ·to do so,
it is the duty of the courts, in the construction
of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile laws, and
to adopt that construction of a statutory provision
which harmonizes and reconciles it with other
statutory provisions. A construction of a statute
,\·hich creates an inconsistency should be avoided
when a reasonable interpretation can be adopted
which will not do violence to the plain words of
the act and will carry out the intention of Congress. *- ,y,, * In order that effect may be given
to every part of an act in accordance with the
legislative intent, all the language of the act
must be brought into accord. The various provisions of an act should be read so that all may,
if possible, have their due and conjoint effect
without repugnanc~- or inconsistency, so as to
render the statute a consistent and harmonious
whole. - Hence, where two constructions of a
st·atute are possible, by one of which the entire
act may be harmonious while the ather will
.create discord between different provisions, the
former should be adopted; ·Although the courts'
cannot add to, take from, or change the· language
of a· statute to give effect to any supposed intention. of the legislature; words . and ·phrases may
·be altered-. and supplied when that is necessary
to obviate repugnancy and inconsistency and to
-give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature.- The legislative i,ntention will prevail over
the literal import of particular terms, and will
control the strict letter of the statute, where au
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adhereueL' to such ~triet letter would lead to
contradictory provisions. * * * '' (50 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 363, pp. 36'7-369.)
••Particular statutory provisions may present
such an inconsistency as cannot be har1nonized
·or reconciled. It is obvious that effect cannot
be given to all the provisions of a statute where
some of then1 are inconsistent and irreconcilable.
In such case, as in other cases, a construction is
sought w·hich would give effect to the purpose of
the statute and the intention of the legislature.
* * * " (50 Am. Jur., Sec. ·364, pp. 369-370.)
c. It is a cardinal rule of construction that
significance and effect shall, if possible. be accorded to every section, clause, word or· part of
the act." {2.5 R.C.L. 1004.)
•' The several provisions of the statute should
be construed together in the light·~ of the general
purpose and object of. the. act and so as to give
effect to the main intent and purpose of the
legislature as therein expressed.'' ( 25 R.C.L.
1007.)

.

''An interpretation which defeats ·any of the
manifest purposes of the statute cannot be accepted." (2.5 R.C.L. 10J.4.)
.."·····'·

U sin.g these well

_e~tabli~_~ed rli~es of cO,·nstruction

_as a basis for determining the legislative intent in ame:Qd_ing in 194~-, Section 76-5~2~~=utah c~d.e t94~ ·t~\ts. ·p~~Se!lt
form, it is seen that the legislature had'in mind :the deci··-·
--.
sion of the Supreme Court in the· . McCa'rthy· ca:~e ·supra,
and that it intended to codify the rlil~ of that case by requiring that' all applications for contract ~-a~ri~~'s:permits
should be granted on_ly after hearing, whereof notic~ had
been given. This purpose is clearly shown. by the elimi25
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nation of the phrase ''by any ·other person than those
referred to above in this section", which was contained
in the 1935 act (Sec. 9, Chapt. 65, Laws of Utah 1935 ).
As to practice and procedure, the legislature made no
distinction between those entitled to permits under the
"grandfather" clause and late comers, but required in
all cases that the permit be granted only after hearing
upon notice. With this purpose definitely ascertained,
the task remains to discover a construction which will
maintain the integrity of this legislative purpose, and
at the same time reconcile the "grandfather" clause
with the second paragraph of the section. In this connection, the excerpt from the M cO arthy opinion above
quoted is pertinent, and particularly the statement:
''In the nature of the case, such permits
[meaning permits issued without notice or hearing] can only operate as prima facie evidence of
the right of the permittee to operate thereunder.
Least of all, can it be properly said that such a
perrp.it, issued upon application, excludes the
right of a competitor to contend and to show to
the Commission * * * that the permittee in his
operations * * * has entered into regular competition with-let us say-common motor carriers
* * * '' (Italics supplied)
That declaration suggests strongly a construction and
interpretation of the statute which will attain the main
objective of the legislature and at the same time make
effective all provisions of the statute. It is believed, and
it is hereby earnestly urged, that a reasonable meaning
of the statute may be deduced as follows:
(a) That all applications for a contract carrier's
carrier's permit, whether by pr.eferred persons

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

under the "gnindfather" clause or by latt.•
come.·s into the transportation field, must be
set for hearing· upon a date certain, and notice
of the hearing be given:
That no contract carrier's permit shall issue
until after a hearing in which persons adv:ersely
affected may appear and submit evidence on
their behalf, and cross-ex:amine opposing witnesses:
In the event there is a "full dress" hearing held
after interested parties have appeared in opposition, the Commission must, from the evidence,
find the four conditions existing as set forth
in the second paragraph of the statute before
a permit may issue;
In determining the existence of such conditions,
proof that the applicant is a preferred person
under the "grandfather" clause will prima facie
establish his right to a permit, and cast the
burden of going forward with the proof upon
his opponents to disestablish this prim:a facie
right, the burden of proof remaining, however,
in toto upon the applicant to establish the four
conditions named in the statute.
If after the Commission has set the application
for hearing upon a date certain and has given
notice, no interested persons appear in opposition to the granting of the permit, proof that
the applicant is a preferred p·erson under the
"grandfather" clause will entitle him to a permit.

Under the foregoing construction, the "grandfather"
clause, in ·dew of the 1945 amendment, does not confer
upon an applicant a substantive right, but rather a procedural advantage. This procedural advantage is not a
mere shadow or chimera, but is a process of \'alue to an
applicant in seeking a permit. It is an adyantage well
known to legal prqcedun-'.*
*As an example', Section 80-12-4 Utah Code 1943 provides tha~
a transfer of a material part of a decedent's estate in the nature of
a final distribution thereof, made by a decedent within three ye~r~
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It is earnestly contended by the defendants that the
foregoing construction and interpretation of this statute complies with recognized rules of statutory construction; perpetuates the intention of the legislature;
does no violence to the rights of the parties interested,
but rather preserves the same and recognizes due procE~-ss
procedure, so strongly implied in the McCarthy decision,
supra.
A review of the record in this case reveals that the
Commission recognized both the rule of the McCart/I:!J
decision and the mandates of the 1945 act. The plain ..
tiffs' application was set for hearing upon a date certain, and all interested persons notified. The defendant
carrier appeared in response to said notice, and contested the application. The plaintiff primarily rested
its case (mistakenly, we believe) upon its "grandfather"
rights, a'S it does in these review proceedings. Substantial evidence was submitted which enabled the Commission to make definite findings: (·a) that the applicant
had f-ailed to show that existing transportation f~acilities
did not provide adequate or reasonable service, as required by Section 76-5-21, as amended; (b) that tht!
granting of the permit would detract from the business
of the existing carriers, which would eventually impair
rather than improve transportation service in the area
proposed to be served; (c) that the defendant carrier
is ready, able, and willing to render reasonable, adequatn
prior to his death, except a bona fide sale for a fair consideration,
"shall be presumed to have been made in contemplation of death."
Any lawyer is well aware of the difficulties of overcoming this
presumption or prima facie case in opposition to the tax authorities'
purpose to tax such transfer.
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tn the area and the ~hippPr eoYPI'l'd by tlw application: (d) that ~nffieient ~ervieP i~ nln·a<ly nYailnl>lu
in the area propo~Pd to be ~erYed- by thP applieant; and
•, e) that the g-ranting of the application would be dd rimental to the be~t interP~t~ of tlw people in the area
covered by the application.
H'l'Yl<:l:'

In view of the foregoing, it i~ submitted that plaintiff~' contention that it wa~ auto1natieally entitled to u
contract carrier\~ pennit in the instant case by virtue
of preferred rights conferred upon it by the ''grandfather'' clause, is without merit.

II.
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THEBENEFIT OF THE "GRANDFATHER" RIGHTS
UNDER SECTION 76-5-21, UTAH CODE 1943, AS
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 105, LAWS OF UTAH
1945, BECAUSE (1) THEY WERE NOT A CONTRACT CARRIER ON JANUARY 1, 1940 AND
(2) THEY ILLEGALLY TRANSPORTED SUGAR
OVER PUBLIC HIGHWWAYS FOR UTAH-IDAHO
SUGAR COMPANY FROM WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
TO SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, DURING THE
PERIOD FROM MAY 8, 1945, TO THE DATE O:F
HEARING BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION IN THIS MATTER.
E,Ten though plaintiffs' construction of Section 76;}-:21, l~tah Code 1943, as amended by Chapter 105, Law:-:
of r tah 1945, . be adopted, the evidence in this ca..;p
pron·~ that they were operating on January 1, 1940
under the '' 15 mile'' exemption and also that they haJ
forfeited their right to claim pri,Tileges under the
• 'grandfather'' clause of the statute. The testimony
of Oeorge ~l. Sims and Elmer A. Sims, witnesses
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on behalf of plaintiffs at the hearing before the
·Commission, hereinbefore set forth in the defendant
carrier's supplemental statement of facts, abundantly
demonstrates that the plaintiffs transported sugar for
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company upon the public highways of Utah between the West Jordan plant of the
Sugar Company and Salt Lake City, Utah, during the
period commencing :May 8, 1945 and up to the date o:f
hearing before the Commission. Their testimony also
shows without contradiction that the plaintiffs did not
secure from the Commission a contract carrier's permit
to cover this transportation.
Chapter 105, Laws of Utah 1945, also amended Section 76-5-25 Utah Code 1943 by striking therefrom these
two exemptions from the operation of the Motor Carriers
Act:
(a) ''To contract motor carriers of property
when operating wholly within the limits of an incorporated city or town and for a distance of not
exceeding fifteen road miles beyond the corporate
limits of the city or town in Utah in which the
point of origin of any property or passenger
movement is located or when operated within a
radius of 15 miles from any point of origin outside of an incorporated city or town in Utah, and
which movement either alone or in conjunction
with another vehicle or vehicles is not a part of
any journey or haul beyond said fifteen-mile
limit;"
(i) "To the casual or occasional transportation
of persons or property for compensation by any
person not regularly engaged in transportation
30
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by nwtor Yehieles

a~

his or its principal oceu-

pn tion or busine~8. · ·

The legal re:3ult of the repeal of the "15 mile" exemption forn1erly contained in the 1935 act (Section 76-5-25
Utah Code 1943) is described by ~Ir. Justice Latimer in
the prevailing opinion in RaiCley v. Ptl!blic Service Cornmission of etah, ______ Utah _______ , 185 Pac. (2d) 514, at 5H)

as follows:
"The effect of these latter amendments was
to bring under the control of the commission all
carriers operating within cities and towns and
for a distance of. not to exceed 15 miles beyond
the corporate limits, and also to the casual or
occasional operator who was operating but whose
principal busines~ "-as not transportation.''
When Comn1issioner Hacking interr.ogated both Mr.
Elmer L. Sims and :Jlr. George A. Sirns, witnesses for
p}aintiffs, ·he particularly directed. his questions as to
the plaintiffs' conduct of· their business after the effective date (~Iay 8, 1945) of Chapter 105 Laws of Utah
1945,. amending Sections 76-5 .. 21 and 76-5-25 Utah Code
1943. Both of these witnesses gave responses that indicated definitely that the plaintiffs: had been using the
public highways for transpo:r;tation of sugar for the
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company during said period without
securing any contract carrier'~ permit therefor. ~Ir_.
George A. Sims' testimony further indicates. that. the
plaintiffs had prior to May 8, 1945,. hauled the suga_r
under the '' 15 mile'' exemption contained in _sub~ paragraph (a) of Section 76-5-25 Utah Code 1943 before it
was eliminated by the 1945. amend1nent. There is abso-31
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lutely no evidence in the record that on January 1, 1940,
or at any other time, the plaintiffs had obtained a contract carrier's permit to handle sugar for the UtahIdaho Sugar Company. Conversely, the evidence shows
without contradiction that the plaintiffs transported
this sugar under the "15 mile" exemption, and that
when that exemption was repealed on May 8, 1945, they
did not make any effort to secure a contract carrier's
permit. Rather, they continued operations without authority, and speciously explained such conduct at the
hearing by stating they believed they had authority
automatically to continue such service without specific
written authority from the Commission. (R. 84)
The evidence shows that plaintiffs were the holders
of Contract Carrier Permit No. 212, as amended, dated
February 23, 1939, issued in Case No. 1849 (R. 73, 125,
126, 132) wherein the plaintiffs were authorized to transport certain specific property for six identified contractees (none of which was the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com• pany) over several separate routes in the State of Utah.
(R. 73, 75) There is no evidence that the plaintiffs were
ever granted a ''general contract carrier permit'' such
as suggested by Mr. Justice "\Volfe in his concurring
opinion in the McCarthy case, supra. (P. 22·6 of 184
Pac. 2d) The evidence in fact shows that the plaintiff~
had been granted permits covering services to be rendered to six contractees over defined routes, none of
which wa.s the West Jordan-Salt Lake City route. Prior
to the 1945 amendment, the plaintiffs had operated under
the '' 15 mile'' exemption, but upon the removal of this
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exemption fron1 thP -la\\', the plaintiffs automatically
carne under the control of the Comission, and it wa~
their duty to apply at once to the Commi~~ion t'or a
eontract carrier'~ pern1it eoYering the tran~portation
of sl!gar for the Ptah.:.Idaho Sugar Con1pany. r:Cht> failure o'r refusal of plaintiff~ to secure this permit made·
their transportation of ~ngar over publie highwa)·s a11
illegal operation, and brings it squarely \dthin the rule
of the Rou·ley ease.
Section 76-5-:21 Utah Code 1943, as amended hy
Chapter 105 Law8 of Utah 19-!5. denounc~s as unlawt\11
the act of any contract n1otor carrier in operating as
such carrier in intrastate connnerce without first having
obtained from the Comrnission a permit therefor. After
the repeal of the · '15 mile'' exemption on ::\lay 8, 1945,
the plaintiffs in transporting sugar for Utah-Idaho
s.ugar Company were as guilty of violating the law as
Rowley had been. They had no right to use the public
highways of Utah for such purpose. The fallacy of
plaintiffs' position -is demonstrated by this simple factual statement:
(a) Since repeal of the "15 mile" exemption, plaintiffs' transportation of sugar from vVest Jordan to Salt
Lake City could not rest upon the '' 15 mile'' exemption.
It was gone.
(b) Plaintiffs at no time held a general contract
carrier's permit (assuming suchtype of permit is authorized by law), but its contract carrier's permits covered
contractees other than the Sugar Company and specifically covered other routes.
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(c) The plaintiffs at no time obtained a contract
carrier's permit for their sugar hauling operations.
The plaintiffs continued their illegal operations
even after they filed their application for the permit now
involved. Note the following exchange between Commissioner Hacking and the witness Elmer L. Sims:
''CoMMISSIONER HACKING: As I understand
your testimony, you have rendered this service
• to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company at West Jordan
for some considerable period of time~
A. Yes.
CoM. HACKING: And are still rendering it.
As you stated, you sent a truck out yesterday t
A. Yes." (R. 84)
There is a suggestion in the testimony of plaintiffs'
witnesses that they had filed with the Commission a contract with the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company other than
the contract now involved in this action. (R. 71, 85) The
contention of plaintiffs (R. 71, 85) that the mere filing
of the other contract (if one existed; it was never found)
with the Commission was a sufficient compliance with
the law, is a ridiculous conception. The mere filing of a
contr~act with the Commission is certainly not obtaining
a permit.
With respect to sugar hauling opeartions for the
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, the plaintiffs were not in
a position to claim the benefits of the "grandfather"
clause, either as a substantive or as a procedural right.
First, because on January 1, 1940 they transported sugar
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unrler thP · ·1;) mih•'' exl•mption. At thP lH•aring tlwy
rt>peaterlly made this claim. Thi:-: operation certain]~·
wa~ not a contrart em-rier operation. Second, they had
been E>ngagPd ::'incE' ~lay ~. l~).f;) in an illegal opPration, and under the dortrine of thP Rowley ca~<·
should be dE>nied the right to as~Prt the privileges of th,•
• •grandfather" clan~t>. The Conunission committed no
error in itB failure to make a finding regarding the
;::;tatus of plaintiffs as a contract nwtor carrier on Jannary -1, 1940. The absence of any such finding from the
re~:<:n·d is 'yholly jristifie(} because plaintiffs on January
1, 1940 operated under the "15 mile" exemption and
al~o because- of plaintiffs' illegal use of public highways
of the_ State of Utah subsequent to May 8, 1945.

III.
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A CONTRACT CARRIER PERMIT
WAS NOT AN ARBITRARY ACT OF THE COM:MISSION, BUT WAS BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH NEGATIVED PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO SUCH PERMIT.
Plaintiffs have arg-ued in this litigation that even
if their purported or alleged rights under the ''grandfather" clause are eliminated from consideration, they
submitted to the Commission substantial evidence which
entitled them to a contract carrier's permit. This is
but another way of asserting that the Findings of the ·
Commission are not supported by substantial evidence
anrl that its denial of the application was capriciQus and
arbitrary, and therefore constituted error of which the
Supreme Court may take . cognizance in these· proceecl-
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ings. With respect to the Supreme Court's authority on
this aspect of the case, the following quotation from
Goodrich vs. Public Service Commission et al, (----. Ut.
------, 198 Pac. 2d 975) is pertinent:
"We have repeatedly held that in reviewing
cases certified to this court from the Public Service Commission on a statement of error that the
Commission's report, findings, conclusions and
order are unlawful, we are limited in our review
to ascertaining whether or not the Commission
had before it substantial evidence upon which to
base its decision. Only in the event that we find
the Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or
unreasonably in denying applicant's petition can
we set aside the order.''
It was the obligation of the plaintiffs to demonstrate to the Commission by competent evidence that:
(a) the highway over which the applicant desired to
operate was not unduly burdened; (b) the granting of
the application would not unduly interfere with the
traveling public; (c) the granting of the application
would not be detrimental to the best interests of the
public of the State of Utah and/or to the localities
served; and (d) the existing_ transportation facilities do
not provide adequate or reasonable service (See. 76-5-21
Utah Code 1943, as amended by Chapter 105 Laws of
Utah 1945). The burden was upon the plaintiffs to establish these conditions.·
However, the defendants will assume in their argument on this aspect of the case (without waiving their
contention that the plaintiffs are not entitled to ''grandfather rights'') that the plaintiffs in this application
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\\ t>n" a contract nu)tor L'arriL'l' ou January 1, 1~40, and

were en tiled prima faeie to a contract ea rric•r '~ permit
under the construction of the statute hereinbefore submitted under point I
this brief. This proble1n is therefore approached with the assumption that the plaintiffs,
\Yithout submitting any further PYidence than their contract c.arrier status on January 1, 1940, "made their
case'' and cast the burden on the defendant carrier of
going forward "Tith the evidence to disestablish this
prima facie right to a permit. This is a radical coneession in plaintiffs' favor, but the defendant carrier
makes this hypothetical concession in the full faith and
belief that the evidence submitted by it plus the admis~ions of .Jir. H. \Y. Ansell, a witness on behalf of the
plaintiffs, fully supports the Findings of the Commis~ir>'n. .Jlr. Ansell was the General Traffic ~Ianager of
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, and the Sug,ar Company \\~ould be the direct beneficiar:T of any contract
carrier's permit granted plaintiffs. (R. 87) In this connection, ~Ir. Ansell's admission upon cross examination
i~ most pertinent:

of

'' Q. Do I understand you only call on Salt Lake
Transfer in these emergencies~
A. In general, yes. It might be times when
our office is rushed, and rather than calling
:Magna-Garfield and then waiting for a while to
see whether they can do it or not, they just want
to satisfy that man, and they call the Salt Lake
Tran~fer Company.
Q. As a matter of fact, it is a continuous
practice, isn't it, ~f r. Ansell, emergenry or no
Pmergency j?
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',

A. No, I don't think so. I wouldn't say that.
Q. Do you know~
A. Well, I know that we endeavor to give the
Magna-Garfield a good share of our business, of
the normal business, you might say.
Q. Then you are representing to this Commission that this contract really only becomes
operative in these emergency periods; is that
correct~

A. In general.
Q. Why do you qualify it, in general~ Why
that expression?
A. \Vell, as I just said, something might come
up after lunch, and the man wants his sugar
delivered to him that day.

Q. So, it is pretty much of a practice through'"
out the year, isn't it~
A. To the extent it could happen almost any
time.
Q. So, this isn't an emergency at all. It is
a continuous process you contemplate~

* * *- * *
A. I have endeavored to show these things
happen on a little unusual circumstance, and, in
general, as I keep saying, we give the :MagnaGarfield a steady flow of business when they can
give us the service we require. But if some occasion has brought about necessity for quick service
from West Jordan within the hour, then we give
the business to the Salt Lake Transfer Company.
Q. Well, now, with this new contract, if it is
approved by the Commission and a permit issued,
you are going to give the Salt Lake Transfer all
the business, aren't you~
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~\. ~o, that i~ not tnw. \\'e would ~till givP
the :Jlagna-Garfielrl the bm~inP~~ on whieh then•
i~ no emergt>ney fur quirk rlelin•ry.

Q. Trcll . .lJOII hare no critici,-.·,n of tl/(' lu111dliJI/f
of the shipments by Jfa.tnw (( Garfield, tlwt yo1t
hare giren to them!

A. Xo; it has been

l'CJ)f

satisfactory.

Q. r ou hare no criticism of its automoti·ve
equipment it uses in that respect?
~\.

Xo.

Your whole contention i~:, then, .Mr.
that the common carrier here involved
cannot render this emergency, is that the theory,
which emergency service is brought about b)'
comparatiYe conditions~

Q.

~\nsell,

A. That's right, cannot render a speedy
service, would probably be a better word than
'emergency'.

*
Q. And .the handling of sugar does not require any particular type of automotive equipment, does it~

A. X o, except it has. got to be kept fron1 the
weather, of course.
•

Q. Of course. And you have no co1nplaint of
the equipment of the Magna-Garfield on lhat
score1
A. I do not." (Italics supplied) {R. 104, 105,
106,

197)

Therefore, plaintiffs' own evidence establishPs lwyond peradventure that the defendant cmTIPr has ren39
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dered to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company a service which
has been free from criticism, and which has been very
satisfactory. Furthermore, Mr. Ansell admits that the
Sugar Company has no complaint as to the type of
equipment used by the defendant carrier. It is weather
proof equipment. It is obvious from Mr. Ansell's testimony that the Sugar Company supported plaintiffs' application on the single basis that it could obtain fro:n
the ,applicants a speedier service. The issue therefore
becomes a narrow one, and that is whether the defendant
carrier proved that it can render this speedier service.
The evidence on behalf of the defendant carrier definitely
proves that it has both the equipment and the personnel
to render this speedier service. The President of the
defendant carrier denied the assertion that his company was not able to render the Sugar Company the
service required by it. (R. 144, 145, 151) He described
at length the equipment maintained and operated by the
defendant carrier. The company maintains a regular
schedule to Bingham and Garfield. ·( R. 142) The regularly scheduled trucks leave Salt Lake at 10:00 A.M.
each week-day morning, but his company is prepared to
furnish other and additional trucks in any emergency.
(R. 153) Three trucks are operated on the Sah Luk..
Bingham route, and one on the Salt Lake-Garfield route.
(R. 153) The Company owns eight trucks at presen ,
and employs six drivers, but it has available sources to
secure other automotive equipment, upon immediate demand, and has available two emergency drivers. (R. 142,
143) In the knowledge of the President there was only
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one instmwe of the defendant earrirr '8 failure to comply
with the Sugar Company's request, and that wn~ a demand late in the afternoon for a delivery within a half
hour from the call. The President explained to the Sugar
Company that he could not meet the demand for a deliYel'Y within the half hour, but was prepared to make it
within two hours. (R. 144) X o employee of the defendant
carrier is authorized to refuse any shipments. (R. 157,
158) The haulage of sugar from. the \Vest Jordan fac.
tory is on the Salt Lake-Bingham operation of defendant carrier. (R. 152) On the return trip from Bingham
these trucks are author,ized to n1ake "pickups" at intermediate points. (R. 156) _The back haul is very snmll,
and a stop at the West Jordan factory to pick up a
shipment would be entirely pos~ible. (R. 156) If the
Suga_r Company requires full truck loads to be moved,
the defendant carrier is prepared, upon notification, to
provide such truck equipment. (R. 151) The defendant
carrier is prepared at all times to render the Sugar Conl-·
pany the quick deliveries of large quantities of sugar to
Salt Lake City. (R. 145) Specifically, the President of defendant company denied the testimony of the Sugar
Company witness that the defendant carrier had not
been able to render the service required by the Sugar
Company, in view of competitive conditions in Salt Lake
City. (R. 145) He asserted that his company was able
and willing to handle the same quantities of sugar as
have been handled by the applicants, and to render the
transportation :-;prvice with the same speed and e:fficienr:as the applicants. (R. 145)
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It is not the task of the Supreme Court to weigh
evidence or resolve conflicts in evidence. Its function
in reviewing cases of this type is to determine whether
there was substantial eidence before the Commission to
support its findings. Conflicts in the evidence as to
whether the defendant carrier was ready, willing and
able to render the so-called speedier service were for
. the Commission alone to resolve. By its findings the
Commission resolved this issue against the plaintiffs.
At this hearing there was no issue concerning the burdening of the West Jordan-Salt Lake highway, or of
undue interference with the traveling public. The evidence was directed solely to the question whether the
granting of the application would be detrimental to the
best interests of the State of Utah and/or to the localities to be served, and as to whether the existing transportation facilities provide adequate and reasonable
service. There was substantial evidence before the Commission from which it could reasonably find that the
transportation facilities offered by the defendant carrier were and would be adequate and reasonable, even
considering the extraordinary demand of the Sugar
Company for ''speedier service.'' The evidence also
justified the Commission in reaching the conclusion that
public interest would be damaged if it granted the requested permit. In this connection the quotation from .
People's Transit Company v. Henshaw (8 Cir., 20 Fed.
2d 87 at p. 90) quoted in the McCarthy opinion, supra,
is appropriate:
''The results of such .competition, where there
is not sufficient business to sustain all of the
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co1npetitors, i~ that a ~l·a::-;on of experieneP en u~e8
all or some to drop out or eompeb tlw pnrehn~t'
of competitors (usually at exaggerated amounts),
thus eansing an increase of capital Pxpenditure
of the purchasers upon which the chargPH to tlw
public must be based and thereby inerPn~P<l.
· •These considerations, and others, amply
ju::'tify differences to protect and pre~Pl'\'P thi•
existing pennanent s.Ystem. )J" o ne\v sy~tem lw~
a legal right to destroy such existing systen1 and
haYe the public at its mercy. The public welfare
is not serYed, but harn1ed thereby. The public
may protect itself against such results. Nor can
·any theory of free competition change this situation. Competition is recognized and encouraged
for the sole reason that it is supposed to result
in the public good. But competition is not necessarily unrestrainable. It cannot be allowed to
harm the very public it was designed to protect
and aid. It may be restrained for the public welfare just the same as monopoly may be restrained
or as competition maY be left unrestrained. The
test in each instance is the public good. Where
the restraint upon competition is for the public
good, it is sustainable just as restraint upon
freedom of action by the individual is valid where
tor the public good. Such is the basis of and the
reason for the entire police power.''
1. It will he detrimental to the best interests of
the public and to the localities served, to grant
the permit' to plaintiffs.

The decision in the instant case may in a general
manner set a precedent with respect to motor vehicle
transportation in the State· of Utah, and far-reaching
consequences may result therefrom. The problem presented to the Commission was an exceedingly important
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one, not only to the plaintiffs, the defendant carrier of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company but also to
the public at large. There is fundamentally involved the responsibility of the Public Service Commission with respect to its administration of the act
governing transportation by motor vehicles. One of the
principal purposes of the act is to insure that the public
will secure an efficient permanent transportation service,
whether that service be rendered by common or contract
carriers. It is the duty of the Commission to administer
the law with wisdom and foresight, to the end that the
public may be best served. The spirit of the act envisions
a state-wide transportation system composed of numerous units, be they either common or contract carriers,
who are financially respons: ble and are ready, willing
and able to furnish to the public the service that it deserves and requires. While neither certificates of convenience and necessity nor contract carrier permits
grant any monopoly, and certainly do not vest in the
recipients thereof any right to be free from competition
or to hold a monopoly against the public, there exist:5
intrinsically in the regulatory provisions of the statute
the purpose and intention of the legislature to rrevent
uncontrolled competition between motor carriers of such
nature as would eventually either seriously impair transportation facilities or perhaps ·utterly destroy them. By
vesting in the Commission a ·corrtrolled··<;Iiscretion· as ~to
either' grantirig· or withholding certificates: and· permits,
dep~ndent upon -circumstances, .the -legislature Pvinced
its .intention ·that motor vehiele tran~portation should
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be_so regulated as to prevent the evils of a monopoly on
the one hand and the destructive influence of uncontrolled
competition on the other~ It is by striking· a happy nH.'··
dium between th~ two extremes that .the Con1missio11
achieYes the purpose of the law. An administrative
body like the Commission is best qualified to weigh ,and
measure the fact:5 and circu1nstances of a giYen case, in
order to strike this balance.
It would be lawful for the Commission, under facts
and circun1stances which control the exercise of its discretion, to issue a contract carrier permit over the identical route of, and in competition with a previously authorized common carrier. The law did not intend that a
common carrier holding a Certificate should have, for
all time,· a monopoly on the transportation over the
route served by it, but this is not- necessarily justification. for licensing competing carriers where there is no
public interest involved. The Supreme Court in its de~
cision ~.the case of Utah Light & Traction Company 'V.
Public Service Commission of Utah,· (101 Ut. 99; 118
Pac. 2d 683 at 690) stated :

'' * * * but when a territory is satisfactorily
serviced and its transportation facilities.are ample,
a duplication of such. service, which unfairly interferes· witp existing carriers may undermine and
weaken the transportation setup generally' and
thus deprive the public ofan effiC-ient; permanent
-'
....
.s.ervice.' '__
The defendant -cari~ier is the- 6\\rner~·and liolder of .:a
Certificate of Convenience an<r Nec~s~ity -1ssu:ed hy th{}
Pnblic SPrvice Commission, atithorizin·g it to carry on
4'5·:
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the business of a common carrier between Salt Lake
City and Bingham, Utah, over the highways stated in
said Certificate. The West Jordan factory of the Sugar
Company is served by this common carrier route. There
is a public necessity existing for the maintenance of a
motor vehicle common carrier operation between Salt
Lake and Bingham. At the latter point is. conducted on~_,
of the most important industries in the State of etah,
and the service of that community by an efficient, financially responsible common motor carrier is of great importance, not only to Bingham and Salt Lake City, bnt
also to the public at large. While Bingham is served by
common carriers by rail, operations of the defendant
carrier over a long period of time have proved the far-t
that there does exist a necessity and demand for motor
Yehicle carrier servicr. The Commission, by granting
the Certificate to the defendant carrier, has in effect
found ·such fact. The maintenance of such service in an
efficient manner, is of course dependent primarily upon
the financial returns received by the defendant carrier,
and these returns are dependent upon the volume of
business arising not only in Salt Lake City and Bingham, but also along its route. The business of the Sugar
Company in the movement of sugar to Salt Lake City
from its West Jordan factory is a legitimate contribution to the financial welfare of defendant carrier. Prinla
facie this business belongs to the common carriers which
serve the factory, provided, of course, that their service
is adequate. The defendant carrier is ready, willing and
able to furnish the service to the Sugar Company which
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will meet its dernands and requirements, resultant upon
the highly con1petitive conditions revealed by the evidence. The testimony of the Sugar Company witness in
its fullest thrust serves only to establish the fact that
should this permit be gTanted, the Sugar Company will
be given additional choice of carriers. But this fact
does not establish the ultimate fact which must be found
by the Commission, viz: that it will not be detrimental
to the best interests of the people and of the localities
to be served if such permit is granted. It is ~igorously
urged by the defendants that there is no basis in fact to
justify· the Commission in introducing competition in
the hauling of sugar between West Jordan and Salt
Lake City as against the defendant carrier. The result
of granting such permit would only be to subtract frorn
the defendant carrier a certain volume of business in
order to give the Sugar Company a further choice of
carriers. The granting of the permit might very well
establish a pattern for the Commission in similar cases
which are sure to arise. Let there be a certain number
of incidents, destructive compet.ition between carirers
will be encouraged rather than restrained as conternplated by the law. The mere convenience of one shipper
along a common carrier route is not sufficient reason
to justify the Commission in introducing competition
against its previously licensed common carrier where
there is no evidence that the public at large will benefit
from the same.
The crux of the plaintiffs' case is simply this: The
Sugar Company encounters vigorous competition trom
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other sugar companies which maintain large stocks oi
sugar in Salt Lake City, and it seeks to meet this competition by securing from the plaintiffs a transportatiOn
service which the evidence fails to prove as being necessary, but which simply serves the convenience of the
Sugar Company. It is the contention of defendants that
such evidence utterly fails to support a finding that the
granting of the application would not be detrimental to
the best interests of the- peopl eand of the localities
~en·ed. If the mere convenience of one shipper on defendant carrier's route is reason for the Commission
introducing competition against it, like convenience of
other shippers, multiplied several times, may easily
destroy defendant carrier's business. This is the exact
t~·pe of competition \Yhieh the statute intended the Commission to control or rPstrict. Let it be supposed that
other (fWners of motor Yehicles apply to the Commission
for contract carrier permits over defendant carrier's
route, and base their applications upon asserted convenIence of certain other shippers. What will then be the
attitude of the Commission when it is faced with the
problem of either serving the convenience of the shippers
or weakening the ability of the defendant carrier to perform its public service? The time to stop such process
is at the present. The public good can be best served
by sustaining defendant carrier in its common carrier
operation over the route involved.
2. Existing transportation facilities operated by
defendant carrier provide adequate and reasonable service over its route.

The Commission, in order to justify the issuance of
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a permit to plaintiffs, must also find that existing transportation facilities over the Salt Lake-Bingham route do
not provide adequate or reasonable s~rvice. The evidence in this case does not even suggest that the defendant
carrier has failed in any respect in the performance of
its duties as common carrier over the route involved.
:No complaint has been registered against defendent carrier for its failure to serve the public. The Sugar Contpany witness at the hearing frankly stated that the basis
of the application was solely a question of speedier
rather than emergency service. In other words, there
was a true admission by this witness that defendant
carrier is ready, willing and able to render even the socalled emergency service to the Sugar Company. Apparently the only criticism which the Sugar Company
could make against defendant carrier's service was the
question of time. There is not a scintilla of evidence in
the record that defendant carrier does not possess adequate automotive equipment nor the necessary personnel
to operate the equipment. The testimony of the Presi-dent of the defendant carrier, assuring the Commission
of the ability of his company to perform its functions
as common carrier, stands uncontradicted, and even the
Sugar Company witness did not dispute this statement.
The defendant carrier admitted frankly that there had
been one occasion when the Sugar Company requested
a movement of sugar within a half hour's time, and due to
circumstances then prevailing the carrier requested
two hours' time. The ability of the defendant carrier to
Rerve the public and also to serve the Sugar Company
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rnust stand a~ a definite fact in this case. The President
of the defendant earrier declared that his company was
in a pnf-'i tion, upon demaiHl of the Sugar Company, to
di:..;patch extra trucks in order to effPd this "speedy"
delivery of sugar into Salt Lake. It is impossible, therefa rP, to torture from this evidence a finding that existing transportation facilities, as furnished by defendant
en ITier, do not provide adequate or reasonable service
for the shippers along its route, be they the public in
general or the Sugar Company in particular. There is
no particular conflict of evidence in this case, when it is
<'arefully analyzed and considered. Unless the Commission could find that defendant carrier's transportation
facilities now and in the future do not provide adequate
and reasonable service, it is not authorized_ to grant the
plaintiffs' application.
The defendants earnestly submit to the Court that
the Commission committed no error in denying plaintiffs' application for a contract carrier permit to serve
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company from its West Jordan
Plant.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER,
Attorney for Defendant
Magna-Garfield Truck Line
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General of Utah
_MARK K. BOYLE
Assistant Attorney Ge11eral
Attorneys for Public Sere-ice
Commission of Utah
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